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CASE NOTES
V. CONCLUSION
The distinction drawn by the GTE Services Corp. court be-
tween the permissible and impermissible regulations seems to be
essentially correct. If the FCC were allowed to extend its jurisdic-
tion over the data processing industry in this case, then by analo-
gous extensions the scope of FCC authority would be enlarged
clearly beyond legislative intentions. The significance of GTE Ser-
vice Corp. is that in this case the court held that the FCC's stated
intent to regulate only the common carriers provided insufficient
grounds for rules which imposed de facto regulation on the data
processing industry which itself is not subject to FCC control.
In addition to discussion of the court's view of the legality of the
rules, this note has dealt with certain aspects of the wisdom of the
rules. The SRI report and Chairman Burch's dissent, as well as the
cited history of FCC action regarding prior technological develop-
ments, seem to indicate that the Commission may not have given
adequate consideration to its option not to apply the regulations in
question, particularly Rules (c)(4) and (5). In the factual context of
the communications industry, the possibility of large scale monopoly
over the data processing industry exists only for the Bell system
companies which even without these rules are constrained from
entering the field.' 45 Whatever possibility of derogation of the car-
riers' statutory obligations exists is certainly lessened by the disabil-
ity of the Bell companies, and this fact should have been weighed by
the Commission in considering the wisdom of promulgating the
rules. At least, the possibility of cross-subsidization between tele-
phone companies other than Bell companies and the data processing
entities would not appear to be such a significant threat in deroga-
tion of statutory obligations so as to require the degree of regulation
imposed by the Commission. In this- respect the GTE Service Corp.
decision to invalidate at least a portion of the rules is a move in the
right direction.
	
ALAN J. SCHLESINGER
COnstitutional Law—Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Tax
Liability Investigations—Tax Records in Possession of Third
Party—Couch v. United States.'—In 1969 the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) commenced an investigation of the business tax re-
turns of petitioner, Mrs. Lillian V. Couch, the sole proprietress of a
restaurant.' Pursuant to this investigation IRS agents began exam-
145 See note 33 supra.
1
 409 U.S. 322 (1973),
2 The IRS investigation of petitioner was initiated in order to determine her tax liability
for the years 1964-1968. Id. at 323. The investigative powers of the IRS are appraised in
Miller, Administrative Agency Intelligence-Gathering; An Appraisal of the Investigative Pow-
ers of the Internal Revenue Service, 6 B.C. Ind. Corn. L Rev. 657 (1965).
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ining petitioner Couch's business records in the office of her ac-
countant. Petitioner had given her business records to the accoun-
tant, an independent contractor, for the purpose of preparing
petitioner's tax returns during the period 1955 to 1968. 3 Upon ex-
amination of Mrs. Couch's business records the investigating IRS
agents found indications of considerable understatement of gross
income in petitioner's tax returns. The case was thereupon reported
to the Intelligence Division of the IRS which conducts investigations
of suspected criminal tax evasion.' The IRS Intelligence Division
then commenced a detailed investigation of petitioner Couch's
financial records in order to determine: (1) petitioner's correct tax
liability; (2) the possibility of income tax fraud and the imposition of
civil tax fraud penalties; and (3) the "possibility of a recommenda-
tion of a criminal tax violation." 5
The IRS issued a summons directing petitioner's accountant to
produce petitioner's business records pursuant to section 7602 of the
Internal Revenue Code. 6 Instead of complying with the summons,
the accountant, at Mrs. Couch's request, delivered the records to
petitioner's attorney.? Thereupon the IRS petitioned the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia to enforce
the summons' Petitioner Couch intervened in that action, asserting
that her Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination should bar production of the records. 9
 The district
3
 The accountant was an independent contractor, and not a personal employee of
petitioner. His practice included numerous other clients who compensated him on a piecework
basis. 409 U.S. at 324.
4 It was customary procedure in 1969 for the IRS to have a special agent brought into the
investigation of a suspected crime. Upon his arrival the special agent gave Mrs. Couch her
Miranda warnings. United States v. Couch, 449 F.2d 141, 142 (4th Cir. 1971). See Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5
 409 U.S. at 324. For a criticism of criminal tax sanctions and a discussion of procedural
complexities in tax evasion prosecutions, see Duke, Prosecutions for Attempts to Evade
Income Tax: A Discordant View of a Procedural Hybrid, 76 Yale L.J. 1 (1966).
6
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7602, in pertinent part, authorizes the IRS to examine books,
papers, records and other data in order to determine an individual's tax liability. The IRS
may summon the person liable for the tax to produce the records in question, or may require
an officer or employee of the person liable, or any person having possession, custody or care of
those records, to produce them for investigation.
The summons was directed to petitioner's accountant. It required him to produce 141
books, records, hank statements, cancelled checks, deposit .
 ticket copies, workpapers and all
other pertinent documents" which pertained to the tax liability of the petitioner. 409 U.S. at
323.
Technically, the order to produce the records was then directed at petitioner's attorney,
since, after the summons was served upon the accountant, he ignored it and surrendered the
records to the attorney. However, as the Court stated, "constitutional rights obviously cannot
be enlarged by this kind of action. The rights and obligations of the parties became fixed when
the summons was served and the transfer did not alter them." 409 U.S. at 329 n.9. See United
States v. Lyons, 442 F.2d 1144 (1st Cir. 1971); United States v. Zackutansky, 401 F.2d 58, 72
(7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969).
e The opinion of the District Court for the Western District of Virginia was not reported.
409 U.S. at 324 n.3.
9
 Id. at 325. Apparently, petitioner also claimed that enforcement of the summons would
be violative of her Fourth Amendment rights. Neither the district court, nor the circuit court,
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court held the privilege unavailable to Mrs. Couch, since at the time
the summons was served she was not in possession of the records
described in the summons.'° Petitioner's accountant was ordered to
produce the records required by the IRS summons.
An appeal was taken thereafter to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit." There intervenor-appellant Couch
again attempted to assert her constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination to protect the records in question from IRS
investigation.' 2 The Fourth Circuit held that, because intervenor
Couch had voluntarily relinquished her possession of the records,
she could not avail herself of the Fifth Amendment privilege to
prevent their production.' 3
The Supreme Court granted certiorari,' 4 affirmed and HELD:
When petitioner-taxpayer gives her accountant continuous posses-
sion of her business records, petitioner divests herself of possession
of the records, and therefore, there is no personal compulsion upon
petitioner to produce the records. Hence, petitioner is unable to
avail herself of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled
self-incrimination. 15 The Court further held that petitioner has no
legitimate expectation of privacy under either the Fourth or Fifth
Amendments, as much of the information sought in the course of the
IRS investigation has to be disclosed in her tax returns as a matter
of course.'''
nor the Supreme Court discussed this claim independently of petitioner's other constitutional
claims. The Supreme Court agreed with the government that "this claim is not further
articulated and does not appear to be independent of her Fifth Amendment argument." Id. at
325 n.6.
1 ° Id. at 324 n.3.
11 United States v. Couch, 449 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 143.
13
 Id. The Fourth Circuit held specifically:
The answer to [petitioner's self-incrimination contention] lies in the fact that the
records were not in the intervenor's possession but were in the custody of her
accountant. She had voluntarily relinquished her control of the records. They had
passed from the sphere of privilege surrounding her, for there was no accountant-
client privilege.
Id.
14 405 U.S. 1038 (1972).
13 409 U.S. at 329.
1(1 Id. at 335. Petitioner also asserted that the confidential nature of the accountant-client
relationship and her resulting expectation of privacy in delivering the records protected her,
under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, from tlieir production. However, the Court did not
find that petitioner had a constitutionally cognizable right based upon this asserted expecta-
tion of privacy. Id.
Mrs. Couch also asserted in the Supreme Court that the statutory authorization for the
IRS summons was limited to civil suits, and that therefore its use in that case was improper
because she was potentially criminally liable. The Court declined to follow this view, and
rather summarily dismissed the problem presented by the joint civil and criminal investigatory
purposes of the IRS investigation. Relying on Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517
(1971), the Court found that it is "undisputed that a special agent is authorized, pursuant to 26
U.S.C. 7602, to issue an Internal Revenue summons in aid of a tax investigation with civil
and possible criminal consequences." 409 U.S. at 326.
Taxpayers may be allowed to prevent production of records if they are sought for the
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The Supreme Court's decision in Couch represents an effort by
the Court to provide IRS tax investigators with greater access to
financial records which have been voluntarily transferred by a tax-
payer to a third party. In order to do this the Court had to balance
the constitutional rights and evidentiary privileges of the taxpayer
against the "legitimate interest of society in enforcement of its laws
and the collection of revenues."" Specifically, the Court had to
weigh the conflicting values represented by the traditional rights of
citizens not to disclose certain information—as embodied in the
privilege against self-incrimination—against the necessity of disclos-
ure in a tax system dependent upon honest self-reporting. The Court
reaffirmed its position that generally an individual may not assert a
Fifth Amendment privilege over records not in his possession," and
improper purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution. This doctrine was
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964). However,
this so-called "improper purpose doctrine" has apparently been limited to circumstances where
the sole, or at least the overriding, purpose of the investigation is to obtain evidence for
criminal prosecution. In cases where the purpose is a mixture of civil and criminal liability,
the improper purpose doctrine has not been used to protect the taxpayer. See Howfield, Inc.
v. United States, 409 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1969). For example, in United States v. Hayes,
408 F.2d 932 (7th Cir,), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835 (1969), the Seventh Circuit held: "The fact
that an investigation for the purpose of determining tax liability is deemed likely to produce
evidence warranting criminal prosecution does not make the use of [the IRS] summons an
improper use." 408 F.2d at 936. The Court in Couch relied on Donaldson, which had adopted
the approach of Hayes and several other circuit court opinions. See, e.g., Howfield, Inc.,
supra at 697; United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 885 (5th Cir. 1969). This position
means that a summons may be issued and enforced if it is "issued in good faith and prior to a
recommendation for criminal prosecution." Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 536. Since in Couch there
was only the "possibility" of such a criminal recommendation, Donaldson was controlling, and
the summons could be upheld as a valid exercise of the IRS's authority.
The emasculation of the improper purpose doctrine in Donaldson has been reaffirmed by
Couch. The taxpayer is at a distinct disadvantage since the IRS can always claim that the
evidence to be produced will be used in a civil suit, and merely withhold the actual
recommendation of criminal prosecution until after the damaging evidence has been produced
for purposes of the civil suit. It is the probability of civil action, rather than the possibility of
criminal prosecution, that appears to be controlling in determining "improper purposes." This
position may be seen as a strained interpretation of the intent of the congressional grant of
power to the IRS to issue summonses. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7602, the section which
authorizes the IRS to issue summonses, refers only to the ascertainment of civil tax liability.
Criminal investigations are the province of special agents, whose statutory powers do not
include the specific power to issue summonses, which suggests that Congress did not intend
IRS administrative subpoenas to be used to gather evidence of criminality. See Comment, The
Relationship Between Civil and Criminal Tax Fraud and Its Effect on the Taxpayer's
Constitutional Rights, 12 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 1176, 1193-94 (1971). It has been
suggested that the use of IRS summonses to procure evidence for use in criminal prosecutions
exceeds statutory authority and that therefore evidence so obtained be barred from use in
criminal prosecutions. Id. at 1194. This would be similar to the exclusionary rules in criminal
cases generally. As Justice Frankfurter stated in Watts v. Indiana, 388 U.S. 49, .54 (1949):
Ours is the accusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial system.. . . Under our system
society carries the burden of proving its charge against the accused not out of his
own mouth. It must establish its case
	 . . by evidence independently secured
through skillful investigation.
17
 409 U.S. at 336.
' 8
 Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918); Ex parte Fuller, 261 U.S. 91, 93-94
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more specifically, a taxpayer may not avail himself of the privilege
in the situation where he has voluntarily transferred his financial
records to his accountant.
This note will examine the Court's refusal to extend the
privilege against compelled self-incrimination to an individual who
has voluntarily transferred his business records to a third party. The
majority's test will be criticized for its lack of clarity and a new test
based on Justice Brennan's concurring opinion will be offered. The
implications of Couch will then be assessed in order to determine
their immediate and prospective effects upon the exercise of Fifth
Amendment rights, and upon the expectation of privacy which an
individual taxpayer may have when compiling business records for
the purpose of filing his income tax returns. Finally, the second-
ary issue of the Court's apparent rejection of an evidentiary
accountant-client privilege will be analyzed.
The Couch decision attempted to effectuate the traditional
policy rationales which support the privilege against
self-incrimination. 19
 Underlying the Fifth Amendment privilege is
the concept that it is unjust to coerce a person to provide evidence
that would tend to prove him guilty of a crime. 20 There are many
justifications for the existence of the privilege against compelled
self-incrimination. 21
 Perhaps the most important is that the privilege
serves the function of assuring that "even guilty individuals are
treated in a manner consistent with human dignity. !/22 Reciprocally,
by requiring the courts to so respect the rights of an accused indi-
vidual the privilege fosters public respect for the judicial process. 23
The Court has articulated the purpose and policy of the Fifth
Amendment privilege as founded upon
our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the
cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our
preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial
system of criminal justice . . . our respect for the inviolabil-
ity of the human personality and of the right of each
(1923); Dier v. Benton, 262 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1923); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476
(1921); United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967).
' 9 See generally 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2251 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961); C. McCor-
mick, Evidence § 118 (2d ed. 1972).
2° See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944).
21 The privilege discourages the use of physical torture as a means of compelling
responses to general inquiries. As recently as 1967 the Supreme Court was confronted with a
case wherein the defendant was threatened by the police with firearms in an effort to secure a
confession. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967). The privilege discourages brow-beating
the accused and is therefore thought necessary by the Court to prevent "recurrence of the
Inquisition and Star Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality." Ullmann v. United States,
350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956). The privilege protects the innocent from unjustified conviction. C.
McCormick, supra note 19, § 118, at 252. The privilege forces the prosecution to establish its
case on the basis of more reliable evidence. Id. See generally 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 19, at
225.
22 C. McCormick, supra note 19, § 118, at 252.
2 See id.
189
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life."24
The privilege against self-incrimination is much discussed but little
understood. 25 The words of the Fifth Amendment contain no
criteria upon which to define accurately the scope of the protection
of the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court has derived its
standards for application of the privilege chiefly from consideration
of two factors: (1) the history and purpose of the privilege; and (2)
the character and urgency of the other public interests involved. 26
These criteria imply that at some point the policies of the privilege
against self-incrimination must be subordinated to the requirements
placed upon law enforcement agencies to satisfy societal needs for
order. 27 The privilege is not, therefore, all-encompassing, and the
United States Supreme Court has accordingly placed limitations on
its use. 28 For the purposes of this discussion three of these limita-
tions are especially important. In the first place, the exercise of the
privilege has been limited to "natural persons," 29 and thus has
been held unavailable to corporations, 3 ° labor unions" and
partnerships. 32
 This limitation flows from the concept that the Fifth
Amendment privilege is a personal privilege which seeks to ensure
that the judicial process will respect the human dignity of the
accused." Such considerations are not controlling in situations
where the defendant is a business entity. Secondly, the privilege
applies only when the compelled disclosure is of a testimonial or
communicative nature. 34 Thus, self-incriminatory evidence dis-
closed by an accused under compulsion may not violate the Fifth
Amendment, if it is neither disclosed through the accused's tes-
timony nor through evidence relating to some communicative act of
24 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964), cited in Couch, 409 U.S. at
328.
25
 See McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 S. Ct. Rev. 193 (1967).
26 See Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 449
(1971).
27 See, e.g., California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971) (statute ordering automobile drivers
to stop and give their names and addresses at scene of automobile accident was not impermis-
sible violation of the Fifth Amendment). In Couch the majority stated:
[Ilt is important, in applying constitutional principles, to interpret them in the light
of the fundamental interests of personal liberty they were meant to serve. Respect for
these principles is eroded when they leap their proper bounds to interfere with the
legitimate interest of society in enforcement of its laws and the collection of the
revenues.
409 U.S. at 366.
23 See notes 29.31 infra.
29 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944).
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 f1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74
(1906).
31 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 704 (1944).
32 United States v. Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789,191-92 (2d Cir. 1963).
33 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944).
34 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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the accused. For example, the Court in Schmerber v. California 35
upheld the introduction at trial of a blood sample which had been
taken from an individual, over his Fifth Amendment objections,
because, in the Court's opinion, the extracted blood was not evi-
dence of a communicative nature. Finally, even when the informa-
tion sought by the government is of a testimonial nature, and such
information concerns a natural person, the privilege protects only
that information which would have to be compelled from the ac-
cused person himself. 36
 This limitation focuses upon the question of
coercion of the accused person, through his compelled testimony or
through the compelled production of documents in his control,
rather than upon the incriminatory nature of the evidence itself. 37
Stated in other terms, this means that the Fifth Amendment protects
an individual from self-incrimination, not from incrimination. Jus-
tice Holmes stated this position clearly when he said: "[A] party is
privileged from producing evidence but not from its production." 38
Thus, for example, an accused person may not prevent the elicita-
tion of incriminating testimony from a person who has overheard
the self-incriminatory statements of the accused. 39
The Couch decision illustrates the application of these prim&
ples. The privilege would have been available to Mrs. Couch,
because the business records of a sole proprietorship, unlike a corpo-
ration or partnership, are the records of the proprietor, who is a
natural person." Furthermore, evidence contained in financial re-
cords is of a testimonial or communicative nature, and therefore
such records are within the ambit of the Fifth Amendment's
protections.'" Despite these considerations, however, Mrs. Couch
could not invoke the privilege because her rights were barred by the
third limitation. She had not been compelled to give self-damaging
testimony, nor had she been compelled to produce incriminating
documents within her possession. 42
 The documents which were the
subject of the IRS summons were not within her possession but
instead were in the hands of her accountant. Therefore, it was the
Court's conclusion that petitioner Couch could not avail herself of
the protection of the Fifth Amendment because "in the case before
35 Id.
36 Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913).
37 409 U.S. at 328-29.
3 " Id. at 328, citing Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913).
39 See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303-04 (1966). In United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), the Court stated that it had not indicated in any way "that a
defendant has a justifiable and constitutionally protected expectation that a person with whom
he is conversing will not then or later reveal the conversation to the police," id. at 749, or,
presumably, to the courts.
40 See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944). The test set forth in White is
whether the business entity represents group or personal interests.
41 Documents may be considered an extention of testimonial capacity. See Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886). See also Albertson v, Subversive Activities Control
Board, 382 U.S. 70, 78 (1965).
42 409 U.S. at 328-29.
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us the ingredient of personal compulsion is lacking. The summons
and the order .. . enforcing it are directed against the accountant.
He, not the taxpayer, is the only one compelled to do anything." 43
Despite the fact that Mrs. Couch had not been in possession of
her records, and had not been personally subpoenaed to produce
them, petitioner asserted that she had been compelled to incriminate
herself when her incriminating personal records were made avail-
able to IRS investigators." Thus, the Court in Couch was con-
fronted with the difficult question of determining the scope of the
Fifth Amendment privilege as regards documents which petitioner
claimed to "own" but which were not in the physical possession of
the petitioner. 45
In order to understand Couch and the difficulties of interpreta-
tion engendered by the decision, it is necessary to understand the
specific terminology employed by the Court. The Court attempted to
define the scope of the-Fifth Amendment privilege by utilizing the
concepts of "compulsion" and, of physical "possession."" Initially,
the Court contrasted physical possession of documents with owner-
ship of documents. This same possession/ownership analysis had
previously been used by the Court in the 1918 decision of Per/man v.
United States.'" In that case the party claiming to be the owner of
evidence and seeking to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege over
evidence in a patent infringement case had voluntarily surrendered
it to a third party, and had consequently been barred from asserting
his privilege against self-incrimination over this evidence. The Court
in Perlman indicated that ownership was not determinative of the
issue as to whether the privilege may be invoked."
Couch reaffirmed the position taken by the Court in Perlman.
Ownership, the Court concluded, has little relevance to the personal
compulsion which is the touchstone of the Fifth Amendment
privilege. 49 The majority in Couch stated that "to tie the privilege
against self-incrimination to a concept of ownership would be to
draw a meaningless line. "$ 0 This would be so, the Court asserted,
because the owner of property would always claim to be in "con-
structive possession" of potentially incriminating evidence, wherever
it might be. This would in turn create a "kind of asylum of constitu-
tional privilege" which would be intolerably broad. 5 ' The Court
contended that the criterion for immunity based on the privilege
against self-incrimination is not ownership of property, but rather
43 Id. at 329.
44 Id. at 333. .
45 Id. at 331.
46
 Id. at 336 n.20.
47
 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918). See also Ex parte Fuller, 262 U.S. 91, 93-94 (1923); Diet v.
Banton, 262 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1923).
4°
 247 U.S. at 15.
49
 409 U.S. at 333, citing Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918).
5° 409 U.S. at 331.
51 Id. at 332, citing Perlman, 247 U.S. at 15.
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the "physical or moral compulsion" exerted upon criminal defen-
dants by investigative authorities. 52 The majority concluded that
physical possession would be sufficient to invoke the privilege, be-
cause in order to obtain information in the physical possession of the
accused, physical or moral compulsion would have to he exerted. 53
It would therefore appear that possession, according to the
majority's analysis, was subsumed under the category of physical or
moral compulsion, whereas ownership was not so related. If
petitioner Couch had been in possession of the records, producing
the result that the IRS summons would have'been directed toward
her personally, the element of personal compulsion would have been
present, and she would have been able to assert her Fifth Amend-
ment privilege over the document. However, because petitioner
could not assert possession of the documents, but only ownership of
them, the factor of personal compulsion was not present."
It appeared that the majority in Couch had established physical
possession as the crucial factor in determining whether the Fifth
Amendment could be successfully asserted by an accused over
documents sought in an IRS investigation. Possession, however, was
not considered by the Court to be co-extensive with the scope of the
Fifth Amendment privilege. For when petitioner argued that if the
IRS could reach her records the moment they left her physical
possession and were deposited with an accountant, the basic protec-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination necessarily would be
lost, the majority insisted that this was not the import of their
decision. The Court stated that although actual, physical possession
of the documents bears "the most significant relationship to Fifth
Amendment protection . . . situations may well arise where con-
structive possession is so temporary and insignificant as to leave
personal compulsions upon the accused substantially intact." 55 In so
stating, the Court established an exception to its possession formula-
tion and termed this exception "constructive possession." The Court
cited Schwimmer v. United States 56 and United States v. Guterma 57
52 409 U.S. at 336.
13 Id. at 333. There the Court stated: "We do indeed believe that actual possession of
documents bears the most significant relationship to Fifth Amendment protections against
state compulsions upon the individual accused of a crime." Id.
54 Id.
55
 Id.
16
 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956). In Schwimmcr a third party bailee of an attorney's
documents was served with a subpoena duces tecum. The attorney sought to quash the
subpoena on Fourth Amendment grounds. The court found that retention of the papers was
so temporary as to be merely custodial, that the attorney had constructive possession of the
records sought, and that he could therefore assert his constitutional rights over the records.
57
 272 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1959). Guterma concerned the storage of a taxpayer's personal
records in a safe in the offices of a corporation of which the taxpayer had been Chairman of
the Board. Only the taxpayer and his co-defendant had access to the records. The Second
Circuit upheld the taxpayer's assertion of Fourth and Fifth Amendment privileges as to his
personal records where the grand jury subpoena was directed at the corporation. Id. at 346.
Justice Harlan, concurring in California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 453-54 (1971), stated:
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as examples of situations where an accused individual could assert
his constitutional privilege over records, which, while not in his
physical possession, were, in the Court's determination, in his con-
structive possession. The Court, however, did not further define the
concept of constructive possession. Both Schwimmer and Guterma
provided examples of situations in which the relinquishment was
very temporary and thus defined only one boundary of a spectrum
extending from actual possession to a mere non-possessory owner-
ship.
The facts of Couch appear to define the other extreme of the
continuum. In Couch the taxpayer could not have reasonably as-
serted constructive possession of the records; she could only have
asserted ownership. In Couch the accountant had been regularly
taking possession of the records for the purpose of preparing Mrs.
Couch's tax returns for the years 1955 through 1968. 58 Furthermore,
the accountant was an independent contractor and not an employee
of the petitioner." The length of the accountant's possession and his
independent status confirmed the Court's belief that "petitioner's
divestment [of possession] was of such a character as to disqualify
her entirely as an object of any impermissible Fifth Amendment
compulsion." 6° It is submitted that the Court, by establishing the
constructive possession exception, and by failing to define ade-
quately its extent, has in effect blurred its own definition of
"possession." 61 It will be difficult to determine, in factual situations
falling between the extremes of Couch and Schwimmer, whether the
Court will find that constructive possession is present. For example,
it is not clear whether the Court would find constructive possession
in situations in which the accountant is an employee of the taxpayer,
or in which the accountant has had possession of financial records
for only a few days or hours. By focusing solely upon the concept of
possession, with the attendant confusion inherent in the constructive
possession exception, the Court has taken a position which is rather
The sweep of modern governmental regulation—and the dynamic growth of techni-
ques for gathering and using information—could of course be thought to present a
significant threat to the values considered to underpin the Fifth Amendment. „ . As
uncertain as the constitutional mandate derived from this portion of the Bill of
Rights may be, it is the task of this Court continually to seek that line of accommo-
dation which will render this provision relevant to contemporary conditions.
5R 409 U.S. at 334.
59 Id.
6° Id. at 334-35.
°I Justice Marshall, dissenting in Couch, specifically criticized the majority for this lack
of clarity, stating:
The majority seems to create a bright-line rule that no constitutional right of
petitioner is violated by enforcing a summons of papers not in her possession. . . . I
could not accept such a rule. However, the majority blurs the line by suggesting that
temporary relinquishment of possession presents a different case . . . . The Court
expressly disclaims the proposition that possession alone is determinative of the
availability of constitutional protection for petitioner's papers.. . . But .. the Court
. . . [does not supply] a clearly articulated constitutional basis for the rule adopted.
Id. at 344 (dissenting opinion).
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rigid, and which fails to establish a clearly articulated analysis of the
factors determinative of the self-incrimination issue. It is submitted,
therefore, that the majority's position lacks clarity and that the use
of an analysis based upon possession, ownership and constructive
possession, concepts which were taken from the law of property,
creates confusion when they are used to determine the extent of
Fifth Amendment rights.
A clearer analysis of the self-incrimination issue was set forth in
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Couch. Justice Brennan
stated
I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding
that it does not establish a per se rule defeating a claim of
Fifth Amendment privilege whenever the documents in
question are not in the possession of the person claiming
the privilege. In my view, the privilege is available to one
who turns the records over to a third person for custodial
safekeeping rather than for disclosure of information. 62
Thus for Brennan the significant factor in a Fifth Amendment
analysis is the intent of the taxpayer to protect his records from
investigative scrutiny, rather than the possession of documents,
which was the crucial factor in the majority's analysis. Brennan
would hold the Fifth Amendment privilege available to one who
took reasonable steps to safeguard the confidentiality of the contents
of records, such as by placing them in a safe-deposit box. 63 Appar-
ently, under Brennan's analysis, the privilege against self-
incrimination would also be available to a taxpayer who voluntarily
relinquished records to a third person for the purpose of safekeeping
them.
Brennan's analysis did not rest solely upon the subjective intent
of the taxpayer. The taxpayer's subjective desire for privacy, would
only be given effect when, from an objective viewpoint, it was
reasonable for the taxpayer to expect privacy. Following this
analysis in Couch, Brennan determined that the taxpayer could not
avail herself of a Fifth Amendment privilege, because her action in
giving her records to her accountant in order that he might disclose
financial information on her tax return did not conform to any
reasonable intent on her part to keep the records private and
confidential."
By way of analogy, Justice Harlan's analysis of the expectation
of privacy issue in his concurring opinion in Katz v. United States 65
may provide some insight into Brennan's analysis of an expectation
of confidentiality in Couch. Justice Harlan perceived a two-fold
requirement inherent in the Court's recognition of privacy: (1) an
l2
 Id. at 337.
63 Id.
Id. at 337-38.
65 389 U.S. 347 {1967).
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actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and (2) an additional
requirement that the expectation is one that society is prepared to
recognize as "reasonable.""' So too, Justice Brennan's test in Couch
may be benefited by explicating a two-fold analysis in regard to the
taxpayer's intent: (1) the subjective intent of the taxpayer to main-
tain the confidentiality of his records; and (2) the "reasonableness" of
this intent in light of the taxpayer's actions, and in light of societal
needs for effective taxation procedures.
Justice Brennan's intent test seems to be a more cogent analysis
of self-incrimination issues than the majority's ownership-
possession-constructive possession formulation. Doubtless, in most
situations the result would be the same under Brennan's test or
under that of the majority. Supporting this statement is the fact that
Brennan concurred in the result in Couch. However, although the
final results under either formulation would be similar, Brennan's
test would allow a clearer analysis of the issues involved in making a
determination as to whether the privilege could be asserted. In
situations such as that involved in Schwimmer, 67 for example, while
Brennan would allow the accused to assert a Fifth Amendment
privilege over documents relinquished to another for safekeeping, he
would do so without resort to the imprecise fiction of constructive
possession.
However, even Brennan's analysis was not entirely satisfactory.
His position, specifically in regard to tax cases, apparently adopted
the basic premise that the issue of the reasonableness of the
taxpayer's intent and actions was already decided against the tax-
payer because of the existing requirements of disclosure inherent in a
self-reporting tax system." It would appear, therefore, that once a
taxpayer had given his records to a tax-preparer in order to file his
return, the obligations of disclosure inherent in the tax system made
it untenable for the taxpayer to assert that he reasonably anticipated
confidentiality in regard to his financial records. This position would
place the taxpayer in the sometimes problematical situation of either
(1) safeguarding the confidentiality of his records but giving up the
needed opportunity to consult with a tax expert; or (2) consulting
with a tax expert, to whom he gives his financial records, but
thereby giving up any Fifth Amendment rights or other rights predi-
cated upon an expectation of confidentiality. Thus, neither the
"i Id. at 361.
Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 885 (8th Cir. 1956). See note 56 supra.
" Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6011 states in pertinent part that "fe]very person required to
make a return or statement shall include therein the information required by such forms or
regulations." Int. Rev. Code 1954, § 6677 imposes a penalty fee upon any taxpayer who fails
to provide the information requested. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7203 provides that any
taxpayer who willfully fails to keep records, make a return or supply requested information is
guilty of a misdemeanor imposing a fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment up to a year or
both. If the failure to provide requested information is construed as willful tax evasion, Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 7201 provides that tax evasion is a felony subject to a finé of up to
$10,000 or five years imprisonment or both.
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majority's nor Brennan's analyses confronted this one basic reality
implicit in the tax area. Justice Douglas, in his dissent, put it
succinctly:
The decision may have . . [an] immediate impact which
the majority does not consider. Our tax laws have become
so complex that very few taxpayers can afford the luxury
of completing their own returns without professional assis-
tance. If a taxpayer now wants to ensure the confidentiality
and privacy of his records, however, he must forego such
assistance. To my mind, the majority thus attaches a
penalty to the exercise of the privilege against
self-incrimination. 69
Indeed, many taxpayers customarily give their records to account-
ants or tax preparers. 7 ° The waiver of Fifth Amendment rights by
so ordinary and customary an act as giving financial records to an
accountant seems rather drastic. 7 ' As the Supreme Court noted in
Gardner v. Broderick, 72
 "[t]he [Fifth Amendment] privilege may be
waived in appropriate circumstances if the waiver is knowingly and
voluntarily made." It is difficult to assert that taxpayers who turn
their records over to tax-preparers as a matter of course have know-
ingly waived their Fifth Amendment rights.
Justice Douglas' criticism of the impact of the majority's posi-
tion on the rights of taxpayers points to the dilemma faced by the
Court in attempting to balance the rights of individuals not to reveal
information to the government, as against the necessity for disclos-
ure of financial information by taxpayers in a tax system which
depends on honest self-reporting. On the one hand "it must be
conceded that an adequate source of revenue is the sine qua non of
effective governmental operation of a modern society; of this there
can be no serious dispute." 73
 The IRS has been delegated the
monumental task of collecting approximately 260 billion dollars
from about 80 million individual and corporate taxpayers
annually. 74
 Since these taxes provide the budgets for all other fed-
eral governmental programs, the IRS has been considered by some
as the "keystone of the federal government." 75
 The American tax
system rests upon the belief that each individual will voluntarily and
honestly evaluate his tax liability. However, it would be naive to
believe that every taxpayer is, in fact, truthful. The investigative
631
 409 U.S. at 342.
7(1 See Auditing the IRS, Business Week, Sept. 1, 1971, at 66: "At least half of all
taxpayers must pay for professional help. . . ."
71 See Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 580
(1967); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1967).
72 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1967) (emphasis supplied),
73 Miller, Administrative Agency Intelligence-Gathering: An Appraisal of the Investiga-
tive Powers of the Internal Revenue Service, 6 13,C, Ind. & Coin. L. Rev. 657, 663 (1965).
74 See Auditing the IRS, supra note 70, at 64.
75 Id.
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powers granted to the IRS by Congress serve not only to discover
tax evaders, but also to deter many taxpayers from filing fraudulent
returns or from engaging in transactions solely designed to avoid
taxes. The knowledge that the IRS can audit, investigate and re-
commend punishment, if appropriate, is a powerful incentive to the
taxpayer to disclose his financial dealings fully and honestly. Thus,
it should be noted that the self-assessment system of taxation might
founder if adequate means of investigation were not provided for the
IRS. 76
 On the other hand, the interests of taxpayers in maintaining
their personal privacy and security must be given weight in deter-
mining the scope of the investigatory powers of the IRS. The inves-
tigatory power of the IRS is extremely broad in scope, since every
taxpayer is a possible target of an IRS investigation. This makes the
IRS a potentially potent political weapon. 77
 Commentators have
expressed apprehension over the threat presented to civil liberties by
an agency, such as the IRS, which possesses both extensive inves-
tigatory capabilities and the facilities to centralize such information
and make it available to other governmental agencies. 78
It was this threat to civil liberties which caused Justice Douglas
to dissent in Couch. 79 He criticized the majority for focusing solely
on the traditional personal compulsion aspects of the privilege
against self-incrimination, insofar as it placed undue emphasis on
physical possession. The emphasis, in his opinion, should have been
to focus upon the needs of individual taxpayers to be secure from
overbroad IRS investigation. 80 In his words Couch represented a
further inroad into individual privacy: "[T]he Constitutional fences
of law are being broken down by an ever-increasingly powerful
Government that seeks to reduce every person to a digit."'"
In defense of the taxpayer's privacy, Douglas apparently contemp-
lated the establishment of a "sphere of privacy" founded upon the
fundamental values protected by both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. 82 Specifically, he would include within this sphere of
privacy the financial records of an individual who asserted his
ownership of those records. 83 Thus, in factual situations similar to
Couch, the IRS summons should, in Douglas' view, be successfully
defeated by the assertion of a taxpayer-owner's privilege against
self-incrimination, and by this right of privacy.
Miller, supra note 73, at 663.
77
 Id. at 666. See also Auditing the IRS, supra note 70, at 64.
" See generally McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 S. Ct. Rev. 193;
Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and
the Government's Need for Information, 1966 S. Ct. Rev. 103.
" 409 U.S. at 338.
8° Id.
s' Id. at 344. Justice Douglas is not alone in his belief that individual liberties are
paramount. See generally McKay, supra note 78; Kalvan, The Problems of Privacy in the
Year 2000, 96 Daedalus 876 (1967).
82 409 U.S. at 339.
53 Id. at 344.
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It is submitted that Douglas' analysis approaches the issues
involved in Couch from the proper perspective. The broad inves-
tigatory powers of the IRS need to be counterbalanced by constitu-
tional limits protecting individuals from far-reaching governmental
investigation." Douglas, however, failed to delineate the scope of
the constitutional interests which he would include within this
sphere of privacy. This lack of definition clouds the issue as to the
scope of investigatory authority Douglas would allow the IRS.
Thus, while Douglas did determine that a right of privacy exists
which would provide taxpayers broad protection from IRS investi-
gation, he has failed to limit the scope of the right in such a way as
to accommodate the apparently legitimate investigatory require-
ments of the IRS.
It is submitted, however, that Douglas' failure to explicate
further his position does not emasculate his position, and does not
make the majority's approach more convincing. While the majority
has taken into account the investigatory requirements of the IRS, it
has failed to provide adequate safeguards for individual civil liber-
ties. The majority asserted in this regard that the tax system created
"the very situation where obligations of disclosure exist" and accord-
ingly held that "petitioner here cannot reasonably claim, either for
Fourth or Fifth Amendment purposes, an expectation of protected
privacy or confidentiality." 85
Furthermore, the implications of the majority's position may
extend beyond the facts of third-party possession present in Couch.
The language employed by the majority in Couch regarding
petitioner's lack of expectation of privacy concerning business
records—specifically "information therein is required in an income
tax return"" and "obligations of disclosure exist" 87—may be
significant in this regard. This particular language suggests that the
Court might have been moving toward a recognition of the so-called
"required records" doctrine in the tax area. 88 The required records
doctrine asserts that records which are required to be kept as a
result of certain governmental regulations are not susceptible to
claims of privacy. The implications of this position would be that all
financial records that bear on tax liability would be within the
54 Justice Harlan, concurring in California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 453 (1971), indicated
that there must be a balance struck between taxpayer's constitutional rights and the inves-
tigatory powers of the IRS:
[Although] compelled self-reporting is certainly essential to the taxing power ... the
Fifth Amendment requires some restriction on the efficacy with which the govern-
ment may seek to maximize both non-criminal objectives through self-reporting
schemes and enforcement of criminal sanctions,
85
 409 U.S. at 335-36.
841 Id. at 335.
Id.
1/14 See generally Edgar, Tax Records, The Fifth Amendment and the Required Records
Doctrine, 9 St. Louis L.J. 502 (1965); Comment, 12 B.C. Ind. & Coin. L. Rev. 1176 (1971);
Comment, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 681 (1965); C. McCormick, Evidence § 142 (2d ed. 1972); 8 J.
Wigmore, Evidence § 2259 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
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public domain, and therefore the privilege against self-incrimination
would be unavailable to taxpayers." The leading case formulating
the required records doctrine was Shapiro v. United States. 9 ° There
the Supreme Court held that books and records required to be kept
under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 9 ' became "public
records," and were therefore subject to subpoenae, which could not
be effectively challenged by assertions of self-incrimination.
The Supreme Court has not applied the required records Shap-
iro doctrine per se to tax cases. 92 However, a number of lower
federal courts have extended the doctrine to tax cases. 93 Other lower
federal courts and legal commentators have supported the proposi-
tion that the required records doctrine should not be utilized in this
area." There are several convincing reasons to support the conten-
tion that the Shapiro doctrine should not be applied in tax cases. In
the first place, Shapiro involved an emergency measure and the
national interest required strict enforcement. Secondly, notwith-
standing emergency conditions, Shapiro was decided by a five to
four vote. Thirdly, in Shapiro 'the Supreme Court did not cite the
Internal Revenue Code among the twenty-six regulatory statutes to
which the required records doctrine might apply." Fourthly, the
record-keeping requirements of the tax regulations are extremely
broad and general. 96
 Practically every record related to taxable
income may be deemed a record required by the tax laws to be kept.
Under the Shapiro doctrine taxpayers could be compelled to disclose
the entire range of their financial affairs, regardless of the in-
criminatory nature of the item demanded. 97 This could potentially
affect tens of millions of individual citizen taxpayers, for unlike the
limited investigatory powers of many agencies which have less ex-
tensive jurisdiction, a majority of adult citizens are potential targets
for IRS investigation. In order to justify applying the required
records doctrine to the tax area the Court would have to determine
e See Mansfield, supra note 78, at 148-49.
99 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
91
 50 U.S.C. § 901 (1970).,
92 See Comment, 12 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1176, 1197 (1971); Pemberton, Tax
Fraud Investigations and the Required Records Doctrine, 46 Taxes 209, 211 (1968).
95 See, e.g., United States v. Clancy, 276 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1960); Beard v. United
States, 222 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1955); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
94 See, e.g., Blumberg v. United States, 222 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v.
Remolif, 227 F. Supp. 420 (D. Nev. 1964); In re Daniels, 140 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
See also Lipton, Constitutional Rights in Criminal Tax Fraud Investigations, 45 F.R.D. .323
(1968); Comment, The Relationship Between Civil and Criminal Tax Fraud and Its Effect on
the Taxpayer's Constitutional Rights, 12 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1176 (1971).
95 See Comment, supra note 94, at 1197.
99 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6001 states in pertinent part:
[The Secretary or his delegate] may require any person ... to make such returns,
render such statements, or keep such records as the Secretary or his delegate deems
sufficient to show whether or not such person is liable for tax under this title.
97
 Miller, supra note 73, at 694.
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that the taxing power itself is sufficiently important to justify com-
pelled self-incrimination. 98 Such a determination would have severe
repercussions upon civil liberties. The notion that because disclosure
is required by law the Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply, if
extended to its full logical reach, is capable of entirely destroying the
privilege. As one commentator stated, "lall government that can
roam at will through all records that it may demand to inspect
because it may demand that they be kept is not a government that is
bound to respect individual privacy." 99
It is important to note that the Court in Couch did not explicitly
refer to the required records doctrine. In the context of Couch this
would not have been necessary since the immediate impact of that
decision would only affect the constitutional rights of individuals
who had voluntarily transferred incriminatory records to a third
party. However, as many taxpayers ordinarily use tax preparers to
aid them in the preparation of their tax returns, the result may be
the substantial equivalent of a direct recognition of the required
records doctrine."'" The potential for an implicit recognition of the
Shapiro required records doctrine, therefore, is present in Couch. A
recognition of this doctrine in toto in the tax area would have the
formidable effect of nullifying every taxpayer's expectation of pri-
vacy and Fifth Amendment privileges in IRS investigations."'
Petitioner placed heavy reliance on the landmark case of Boyd
v. United States, 102 which held that compelling a defendant to
produce invoices for goods improperly imported was a violation of
the defendant's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The language
of the Boyd Court was very broad: "any forcible extortion of a man's
own testimony or his private papers to be used as evidence to
convict him of a crime" violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures and the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.'" On its face
Boyd suggested a very broad restriction on the government's ability
to compel disclosure of private records and papers. 104 Justice Doug-
las, dissenting in Couch, agreed with petitioner that the basic thrust
of Boyd, the interplay of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, de-
lineated a sphere of privacy which must be protected against gov-
ernmental intrusion and which should apply in the context of the
facts in Couch. '° 5 Justice Marshall, also dissenting in Couch, as-
98 See Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 440
(1971).
99 McKay, supra note 78, at 217.
10° See Duke, Prosecutions for Attempts to Evade Tax: A Discordant View of a Pro-
cedural Hybrid, 76 Yale L.J. 1, 50-51 (1966): "[A] third party summons is . . . a potent device
with which to circumvent the taxpayer's exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights."
101 See generally Mansfield, supra note 78, at 145-51.
102 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
10) Id. at 630.
1 ° 4 See Comment, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 681, 684 (1965).
1 °5 409 U.S. at 338-39, 343.
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serted that Boyd could be interpreted as holding that the Fifth
Amendment prohibited the use of private papers in a criminal
proceeding over the author's objection. He asserted that the lan-
guage of the Fifth Amendment itself could be construed in that
way. ] 06
The majority refused to accept the sweeping language of Boyd
as controlling in Couch.'" Boyd has not been liberally applied by
the Court.'° 8
 A narrow reading of the case has been utilized by the
Court to ensure that the government's hands are not tied in areas of
governmental regulation. In distinguishing Couch from Boyd the
Court stated that in Boyd the production order was directed at the
accused himself, whereas in Couch the accused was attempting to
assert the privilege over a third person.'" Moreover, the majority
stated that "court decisions applying Boyd have largely been in
instances where possession and ownership cojoined."'" Even in his
dissent, Justice Douglas conceded that decisions subsequent to Boyd
have "refused to apply the privilege to the introduction of 'testimo-
nial' evidence where the author no longer has any property rights or
a valid claim to confidentiality or privacy." 11 ' The majority's nar-
row interpretation of Boyd will render Boyd a rather weak prece-
dent in the tax area, especially in those instances where the taxpayer
has given his records to a third party. " 2
 It is submitted that while
the language in Boyd might well be criticized for being too broad,
Boyd, nevertheless, presents a potentially significant argument in
favor of taxpayers' constitutional rights to which the majority's
position does not give sufficient weight. For, as Douglas suggested,
the concept set out in Boyd of a sphere of privacy subsuming
documents which the taxpayer has authored may create a viable
check on the possibly excessive investigatory powers of the IRS.
In addition to her assertion of the privilege against self-
incrimination, Mrs. Couch attempted to argue that "the confidential
106
 Id. at 345 (dissenting opinion). Justice Marshall stated: "The use of papers over
objection `compel[s] [the author] in [a] criminal case to be a witness against himself.' " Id.
(dissenting opinion).
1 ° 7
 Id. at 330-31.
1 ° 21
 See Comment, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 681 (1965)..
1179
 409 U.S. at 330.
110
 Id. See, e.g., Hill v. Philpott, 455 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Cohen,
388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
in 409 U.S. at 340 n.2.
112
 It is submitted that instead of so restricting the scope of Boyd, the Court could have
limited it in the manner suggested by Justice Marshall in his dissent. Marshall suggested that
the broad language in Boyd, indicating that an owner of incriminating documents could rely
in all cases upon the privilege against self-incrimination, could be limited, and a more
sufficient analysis substituted. He suggested four criteria by which to determine if an assertion
of ownership would be sufficient to enable an accused to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege
over documents not within his possession. These criteria were: (1) the nature of the evidence;
(2) the ordinary operations of the person to whom the records were given; (3) the purposes for
which the records were transferred; and (4) the measures that the author took to insure the
privacy of the records. Id. at 350-51 (dissenting opinion).
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nature of the accountant-client relationship and her resulting expec-
tation of privacy in delivering the records protected her, under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, from their production."" 3
 The ma-
jority held that she could not assert this constitutional protection:
"Mhere can be little expectation of privacy where records are
handed to an accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of
much of the information therein is required on an income tax
return. ”1 14 The Court's discussion of petitioner's claim of expec-
tation of privacy based upon the confidential nature of the
accountant-client relationship was brief, indicating that the Court
believed it had adequately dealt with the matter in its earlier
analysis of the self-incrimination issue.
It is important to note that petitioner did not assert an eviden-
tiary accountant-client privilege, but instead presented a claim of
privacy based upon the confidential nature of an accountant-client
relationship. 15
 The two assertions are distinguishable. An eviden-
tiary privilege is a privilege that is based upon the existence of a
particular relationship (e.g., husband-wife, attorney-client), and
which comes into existence at such time as the requisite relationship
is formed by the two parties. Its purpose is to protect certain
interests or relationships which "are regarded as of sufficient social
importance to justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of facts
needed in the administration of justice." 16 Petitioner's claim of an
expectation of confidentiality stemming from the confidential nature
of a relationship, on the other hand, was based upon the analysis of
two factors: (1) the existence of an unprivileged relationship; and (2)
the reasonableness of the parties' intent to ensure confidentiality in
the particular situation. The Court, as previously stated, rejected
petitioner's expectation of confidentiality claim, but the Court's ap-
parent rejection of an evidentiary accountant-client privilege may be
more significant.
In its discussion rejecting petitioner's claim of a protectable
expectation of privacy based upon the nature of the accountant-
client relationship, the Court stated: "Although not in itself control-
ling, we note that no confidential accountant-client privilege exists
under federal law, and no state created privilege has been recog-
nized in federal cases."'" It is significant that the Supreme Court
' 13 Id. at 335.
"4 Id.
l" Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion is particularly helpful on this point. He stated:
[W]e must consider the ordinary operations of the person to whom the records are
given. A transfer to a lawyer is protected, not simply because there is a recognized
attorney-client [evidentiary] privilege, but also because the ordinary expectation is
that the lawyer will not further publicize what he has been given. , . It would be
relevant to a discussion about the expectation of privacy that an [evidentiary]
accountant-client privilege existed under local law, but not determinative. Petitioner
disclaimed reliance on such a[n] [evidentiary] privilege.
Id. at 350-51 (dissenting opinion).
I" See C. McCormick, Evidence § 73 (2d ed. 1972).
17 409 U.S. at 335.
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has adopted the position of the lower federal courts that no eviden-
tiary accountant-client privilege will be recognized in federal
courts. 18
 This is apparently the first time the Supreme Court has
indicated its adoption of this position.
The leading case formulating this policy of non-recognition in
the federal courts was Falsone v. United States. 119 In Falsone, as in
Couch, an IRS agent served a summons on an accountant to compel
the accountant to testify and to bring records concerning a certain
taxpayer's liability. The Falsone case arose in Florida, which, like
several other states, recognized an evidentiary accountant-client
privilege by statute. 120 The petitioner in Falsone sought to use the
state-created privilege to bar production of the records from IRS
investigation. The court held, on procedural grounds, that since the
records were sought in the course of a federal administrative agency
investigation, rather than in a civil case, the state's law of evidence
was not controlling and that therefore the state-created privilege
would not be recognized.
The apparent adoption of the Falsone position by the Court
means that a taxpayer submitting his records to an accountant will
not be protected from disclosure by the accountant-client relation-
ship, but must instead assert his privilege against self-incrimination.
It is submitted that this is the preferable approach to third party
possession situations. The Court in Falsone did not enumerate the
underlying policy considerations in favor of and opposing the recog-
nition of an accountant-client privilege. However, legal commen-
tators have sought to elucidate these policies. The policy in favor of
an accountant-client privilege rests on the belief that such
confidential communications should be free from judicial scrutiny,
just as certain attorney-client communications are privileged. 12 ! The
existence of an accountant-client privilege might encourage 'tax-
payers to give all their documents to the accountant so that his work
product would be more accurate.'" In addition, growing concern in
recent times with the increase of the government's scope of investi-
' 1 ' See, e.g., Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1006
(1956); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953);
Gariepy v. United States, 189 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1951). However, a kind of accountant-client
privilege may exist where an accountant works for a law firm, but this is in reality an
extension of the traditional attorney-client privilege. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d
Cir. 1961). On the other hand, an attorney-client privilege may not be available when an
attorney is acting in the capacity of an accountant. In re Fish, 51 F.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
119
 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
' 2° Fla. Stat. Ann. § 473.15 (1952). See generally 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2286 U.
McNaughton rev. 1961), which contains a listing of state statutes pertaining to an
accountant-client privilege.
121
 See generally Cohen, Accountant's Workpapers in Federal Tax Investigations, 21
Tax L. Rev. 183 (1966); Note, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1264 {1966); Note, 46 N.C.L. Rev. 419
(1968); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 120, § 2285.
121
 See Note, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1264, 1271 (1966).
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gation of citizens has no doubt supported the creation of an
accountant-client privilege . 123
 Recent alleged attempts by the ad-
ministration to politicize the IRS and to use tax liability investiga-
tions for harassment of political opponents' 24
 might lend support to
a recognition of an accountant-client privilege. The recognition of an
accountant-client privilege would be of great benefit to taxpayers
who wish to keep their records from IRS investigations. Documents
transferred by a taxpayer to an accountant for purposes of tax
preparation could not be subpoenaed simply because the taxpayer
no longer had possession of the documents.
There has been much criticism adverse to the recognition of an
accountant-client privilege. 125
 For example, the report of the Ameri-
can Bar Association's Committee on the Improvement of the Law of
Evidence states:
Of recent years there have appeared on the statute books of
several Legislatures certain novel privileges of secrecy.
Their history has not been traced. . . . [T]he demand for
these privileges seems to have been due in part to a pride
in [accountants'] organizations and a desire to give
[accounting] some mark of professional status and in part
to a false analogy to the long established privilege for
certain professional communications. . . [T]he correct
tendency would be to cut down on the scope of existing
privileges instead of creating new ones. . . . 128
The Model Code of Evidence, adopted in 1942 by the American
Law Institute, the Uniform Rules of Evidence, approved in 1953 by
the National Conference on Uniform State Laws, and the newly
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, introduced in 1973, exclude an
accountant-client privilege.' 27
 The opponents of the privilege criti-
cize it, because it inhibits the ability of the courts to have a complete
hearing of all the facts in a particular investigation. In this view the
necessity for completeness and candor are thought to outweigh the
policy in favor of a confidential accountant-client privilege. ' 28 The
Couch decision strongly reaffirms this policy position as the domi-
nant consideration in regard to the accountant-client privilege. It is
submitted that this is the correct determination. An evidentiary
privilege would be, perhaps, too inflexible, and would provide too
123 See C. McCormick, supra note 116, § 77.
124 See Auditing the IRS, Business Week, Sept. 1, 1973, at 64.
125
 Id. See also 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 120, § 2287, Note, 66 Mich. L. Rev, 1264,
1265 (1966), states: "Because any communications privilege precludes judicial access to
relevant information, courts and commentators generally do not receive them enthusiasti-
cally."
126 See 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 120, § 2286.
127 C. McCormick, supra note 116, § 77; Federal Rules of Evidence, 56 F.R.D. 183,
230-34 (1973).
128
 Id. See also Note, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1264 (1966).
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broad a limitation upon the investigatory powers of the IRS. The
preferable approach would be to analyze each case upon self-
incrimination and privacy grounds. 129
In conclusion, the majority's reliance upon an analysis which
focused upon the concepts of possession and constructive possession
did not establish a clear test for determining the ability of an
individual under IRS investigation to assert his privilege against
self-incrimination. While Justice Brennan's opinion did present a
clearer analysis, it, as well as the majority's opinion, did not give
adequate weight to the taxpayer's needs for privacy in light of the
extensive investigatory capabilities of the IRS. The thrust of the
Couch opinion indicates that the Court may be moving toward the
adoption of the required records doctrine. If this doctrine is ac-
cepted, it will mean that the constitutional right to privacy en-
visioned by Justice Douglas and by the 1886 Boyd decision will be
destroyed, and the privilege against self-incrimination, at least in the
tax area, will be devitalized. The Court's apparent rejection of an
evidentiary accountant-client privilege, on the other hand, will
allow a more flexible, case-by-case analysis of the important issue of
individual privacy present in third party possession cases.
MARILYN B. CANE
Banks and Banking—Incidental Powers of National Banks Under
the National Bank Act—Authority of National Banks to Operate
Travel Agencies—Judicial Review of Administrative Regulations
—Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp. '—Plaintiffs, Arnold Tours, Inc. and
forty-one other independent travel agents of Massachusetts, brought
a class action against defendants William B. Camp, Comptroller of
129 C. McCormick, supra note 116, § 77. It may be interesting to note that in Couch
petitioner-taxpayer had her accountant transfer her records to her attorney after the summons
had been issued. Petitioner might then have claimed that an attorney-client privilege was the
only evidentiary privilege asserted by petitioner. Although the Court did not go into depth on
the issue of attorney-client privilege in the Couch situation, the concept is an intriguing and
significant one. An attorney-client privilege may exist in tax cases where the nature of the
material requested constitutes a privileged confidential communication. See, e.g., Boucher v.
United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963); In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1961); United
States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961). However, the courts distinguish between books
and records given to the attorney and work papers made in confidence for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice. See Note, The Attorney and His Client's Privileges, 71 Yale L.J. 539
(1965). The latter comes under the protection of the attorney-client privilege while the former
fits into the "preexisting document rule." The "pre-existing document rule" is an exception to
the attorney-client privilege which excludes from the privilege documents created prior to the
establishment of the attorney-client relationship or those created during the attorney-client
relationship but not intended to be confidential. See id. at 544. Since the records in question in
the Couch case were created prior to the attorney-client relationship, they fell within the
"pre-existing document rule" and as such were not privileged. Therefore Mrs. Couch's
transfer of the records from her accountant to her attorney was futile if viewed as an attempt
to utilize the attorney-client privilege.
472 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972).
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